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MySpace, Inc. v. GraphOn Corp.: Ignoring the 
Basic Premise that 101 Must Come Before 102 and 
103 
In MySpace, Inc. v. GraphOn Corp., the United States Federal Circuit (“Federal 
Circuit”) considered whether summary judgment of the invalidity of patents-in-suit 
was appropriate.1  The court affirmed the grant of summary judgment and noted 
that the district court correctly decided the case under §§ 102 and 103 of the Patent 
Act,2 as opposed to under § 101, as argued by the dissent.3  In deciding to bypass the 
§ 101 subject matter eligibility analysis,4 the court incorrectly ignored several 
decades of United States Supreme Court (“Supreme Court”) and Federal Circuit 
precedent.5  This decision will lead to increased confusion in the area of § 101 
jurisprudence—an already extremely unclear and convoluted area of law.6  As a 
result of MySpace, Supreme Court intervention will eventually be necessary to 
clarify whether § 101 is a preliminary question or if a judge can avoid it in the 
exercise of discretion.7 
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 1. MySpace, Inc. v. GraphOn Corp., 672 F.3d 1250 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
 2. Id. at 1253.  
 3. Id. at 1264 (Mayer, J., dissenting). 
 4. Id. at 1262. 
 5. See discussion infra Part IV.A. 
 6. See discussion infra Part IV.B.  
 7. See discussion infra Part IV.C.  
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I. THE CASE 
MySpace, Inc. v. GraphOn Corp. was a patent8 infringement case that involved 
four different patents.9  Each of these four patents claimed priority to a parent 
application, filed on December 14, 1995.10  The four patents disclosed a method that 
allowed users to “create, modify, and/or search” for database records over a 
computer network.11 
The litigation began when MySpace, Inc. and Craigslist, Inc. (collectively 
referred to as “MySpace”) individually filed declaratory judgment suits against 
GraphOn Corporation (“GraphOn”) in the Northern District of California.12  
MySpace alleged that they did not infringe the four patents-in-suit because the 
patents were invalid and because an existing patent, called the Mother of All 
Bulletin Boards (“MBB”),13 basically provided the same functions as those functions 
asserted in the patents.14  In stressing that the MBB invalidated the asserted patents 
under any reasonable construction of the term “database,”15  MySpace argued that 
the patents were invalid as anticipated under 35 U.S.C. § 102 (“§ 102”) and obvious 
under 35 U.S.C. § 103 (“§ 103”).16  GraphOn denied these allegations and argued 
that construction of the term “database” was necessary for MySpace’s invalidity 
 
 8. Patents, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., http://www.uspto.gov/inventors/patents.jsp#heading-1 (last 
modified July 31, 2013). A patent is “a property right granted by the Government of the United States of 
America to an inventor to exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling the invention 
throughout the United States or importing the invention into the United States for a limited time in exchange 
for public disclosure of the invention when the patent is granted.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
 9. MySpace, 672 F.3d at 1254.  The four patents at issue were U.S. Patent Nos. 6,324,538 (“538 Patent”), 
6,850,940 (“940 Patent”), 7,028,034 (“034 Patent”), and 7,269,591 (“591 Patent”).  Id.  
 10. Id. at 1254.  
 11. MySpace, Inc. v. GraphOn Corp., 756 F.Supp.2d 1218, 1223 (N.D. Cal. 2010), aff’d, 672 F.3d 1250 
(Fed. Cir. 2012).  A prime example of such a computer network is the internet.  Id.  
 12. MySpace, 672 F.3d at 1253.  Fox Audience Network (“FOX”) is also included in “MySpace.” Id. The 
MySpace and Craigslist cases were consolidated in May 2010.  Id. at 1254.  
 13. MySpace, 756 F. Supp. 2d at 1224.  The MBB was created by Dr. Oliver McBryan at the University of 
Colorado, between Fall 1993 and February 1994.  Id.  The MBB “provid[ed] the ability to have online Internet 
catalogues . . . which could grow without any intervention from a webmaster.”  It also allowed users to create 
entries that others could access, while the webmaster retained control, and it stored all of its files in a 
hierarchical file system.  Id. 
 14. Id. at 1222.  
 15. Id. at 1225.  The three different models of database structures, in use prior to the suit, were: 
hierarchical, relational, and network.  Id. at 1222.  A hierarchical database “uses a tree structure, which 
resembles a parent-child relationship in which one parent can have many children, but a child can only have 
one parent.”  Id.  A network database “uses a modified tree structure that allows for a node to be pointed to by 
more than one parent.”  Id. at 1223.  A relational database “uses a table structure which is designed to manage 
and organize large amounts of related data.”  Id.  At the time of the patents-in-suit, the relational database was 
the most powerful and flexible of all the databases.  Id. 
 16. Id. at 1222.  
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argument because “database” was present in all four patents-in-suit.17  On May 26, 
2010, MySpace filed a summary judgment motion on this issue of patent 
invalidity.18 
The primary issue the district court faced was whether a database consists solely 
of a relational database or whether a database can also encompass a hierarchical 
database, such as a file system.19  If “database” was defined to include both relational 
and hierarchical systems, then GraphOn’s patents, which described a hierarchical 
system, would be invalid as anticipated under § 10220 or obvious under § 103,21 
because of the MBB.22  However, if “database” was defined to only consist of a 
relational system, then it would be unclear whether the MBB invalidates the 
patents-in-suit, and as a result, summary judgment would be inappropriate as there 
would be a genuine issue of disputed fact regarding the invalidity.23  The district 
court did not address the subject matter eligibility requirements laid out in 35 
U.S.C. § 101 (“§101”)24 in its analysis. 
In its analysis of the parties’ claims, the district court began by evaluating the 
claim language for its “ordinary and customary meaning.”25  The court noted that 
the term “relational” was not found anywhere in the patent claims or specification.26  
GraphOn’s proposed construction27 would, therefore, impose limitations that are 
not present in the claims.28  Next, the court turned to the specification and noted 
that the specification encompassed several types of databases, as opposed to a solely 
relational database.29  The court also noted that the specification contained other 
language that weighed against GraphOn’s narrow definition of “database.”30  
Therefore, the court concluded that the specifications supported a broader 
 
 17. Id. at 1225. 
 18. Id. at 1222.  
 19. Id. at 1227.  
 20. See discussion infra Part II.B. 
 21. See discussion infra Part II.B. 
 22. MySpace, Inc. v. GraphOn Corp., 672 F.3d 1250, 1255 (Fed. Cir. 2012).  
 23. Id. 
 24. See discussion infra Part II.B. 
 25. MySpace, Inc. v. GraphOn Corp., 756 F. Supp. 2d 1218, 1225 (N.D. Cal. 2010), aff’d, 672 F.3d 1250 
(Fed. Cir. 2012).  The ordinary and customary meaning is understood to be “the meaning that the term would 
have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in question at the time of the invention.”  Id. (quoting Phillips v. 
AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed Cir. 2005)). 
 26. MySpace, 756 F. Supp. 2d at 1227.  The Court explained that the fact that “relational” was not found in 
the patent claims or specifications supported MySpace’s argument that “database” is not limited to a relational 
system.  Id.  
 27. Id.  GraphOn defined database narrowly as a relational database.  Id. 
 28. Id.  
 29. Id.  The Court inferred that the language in the specification indicated that various types of databases 
were intended by the term “database.”  Id. at 1228. 
 30. Id. at 1228.  
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construction of “database” than solely relational systems.31  Lastly, the court 
considered the extrinsic evidence proffered in the case and noted that the expert 
testimony supported MySpace’s construction of “database” and “reinforced the 
appropriateness of a broader definition of database.”32 
Using these steps, the district court construed “database” as “a collection of data 
with a given structure that can be stored and retrieved” and granted MySpace’s 
Motion for Summary Judgment.33  GraphOn filed a timely appeal to the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.34 
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
The issue of whether the subject matter eligibility requirements of § 101 must be 
addressed before the §§ 102 and 103 issues of anticipation and obviousness are 
analyzed has been addressed in several patent infringement cases heard by the 
Federal Circuit35 and Supreme Court.36  This precedent clearly states that § 101 must 
be addressed at the onset of a patent invalidity analysis, prior to the analysis of §§ 
102 or 103.37 
A) Brief History and Overview of the Federal Circuit 
In order to understand the Federal Circuit’s role in patent infringement cases, it 
is helpful to briefly review its history and jurisdiction.  The United States Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit was created in 1982.38  The Federal Circuit consists 
of a merger between the United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals and 
the United States Court of Claims.39  The Federal Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction 
over appeals in all patent cases and its precedent is binding on those cases.40  Only 
the Supreme Court of the United States has the authority to overturn a decision of 
 
 31. Id. at 1229. 
 32. Id. at 1230–31.  The experts included the inventor of the ‘538 patent and the founder of the MBB.  Id. 
at 1234.   
 33. Id. at 1232, 1243.  In adopting MySpace’s definition of “database,” the Court declined to restrict 
“database” to solely relational system, as set forth by GraphOn.  Id. At 1232.  This invalidated the patents-in-suit 
as anticipated under § 102 or obvious under § 103.  Id. at 1243. 
 34. MySpace, Inc. v. GraphOn Corp., 672 F.3d 1250, 1253 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
 35. See discussion infra Part II.B. 
 36. See discussion infra Part II.C.  
 37. See discussion infra Part II.B–C.  
 38. Court Jurisdiction, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR FED. CIRCUIT, http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/the-
court/court-jurisdiction.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2013). 
 39. Id.  As a result, all cases formerly heard by the United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals are 
now heard by the Federal Circuit.  
 40. Id.  This distinction is what makes decisions of the Federal Circuit different from decisions of other 
circuits.  
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the Federal Circuit.41  Otherwise, the decisions of the Federal Circuit are binding 
throughout the United States if they are within the bounds of the court’s subject-
matter jurisdiction.42 
B) Title 35 of the United States Code: The Patent Act 
Similar to the importance of understanding the Federal Circuit, knowledge of 
Title 35 of the United States Code, otherwise known as the “Patent Act,” is vital to 
understanding patent law.43 In the United States, all aspects of patent law are 
governed by the Patent Act.44  Under the Patent Act, there are four basic 
requirements that an invention must meet in order to be patent-eligible.45  The first 
requirement of patentability, found in §101, is that the invention must concern 
patentable subject matter.46  Under § 102, the application for a patent on the 
invention must be unanticipated and the invention must be timely.47  Under § 103, 
the invention also must not be obvious.48  Lastly, under § 112, there must be a 
sufficient amount of documentation for the invention.49 
Section 101 of the Patent Act introduces the basic categories of patent eligible 
subject matter, otherwise known as the “subject matter eligibility requirement.”50  
The text of § 101 states: “[w]hoever invents or discovers any new and useful 
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful 
improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and 
requirements of this title.”51  In general, § 101 is very broad and most inventions will 
fall under its purview.52  However, the Supreme Court has restricted the reach of § 
 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id.  
 43. See Mary Bellis, Patent Law: Understanding what patent law is and how it effects an inventor,  
http://inventors.about.com/od/patentattorneys/a/patent_law.htm (last visited Nov. 5, 2013) (noting that 
current patent law is outlined by the U.S. Patent Act, Title 35 U.S.C.).  
 44. Jeffrey I. Auerbach, Patent Law Principles & Strategies, (Oct. 2006),  
http://euro.ecom.cmu.edu/program/law/08-732/Patents/PatentLawPrinciples.pdf (“Title 35 of the United States 
Code contains the statutory provisions affecting the grant of a United States patent.”). 
 45. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102, 103, 112 (2006).  An invention must meet the requirements of §§ 101,  102,  103, 
and  112.  Id. 
 46. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). 
 47. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2006). 
 48. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2006). 
 49. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006). 
 50. Daniel McKenzie, Patent Law 101: What’s Wrong and Ways to Make it Right, TECHCRUNCH (Apr. 8, 
2012), http://techcrunch.com/2012/04/08/patent-law-101-whats-wrong-and-ways-to-make-it-right/ (describing 
the categories eligible to be patented).  
 51. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). 
 52. See Charles R. Bruzga, A Review of the Benson-Flook-Diehr Trilogy: Can the “Subject Matter” Validity of 
Patent Claims Reciting Mathematical Formulae Be Determined Under 35 U.S.C. Section 112?, 69 J. PAT. & 
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 197, 197–98 (1987).   
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101 through the creation of three judicial exceptions of what is deemed to not 
constitute eligible subject matter.53  These three judicial exceptions include all “laws 
of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas.”54  Three cases, known as the 
“Big Three,” have provided guidelines and standards regarding the laws of nature 
and physical phenomena.55  However, the meaning of abstract ideas is far more 
ambiguous,56 and courts have had a very difficult time explaining what that term 
means or what it may encompass.57 
The next section of the Patent Act, § 102, is based on the concept of novelty.58  
The section describes circumstances when a patent cannot be granted to an 
inventor because the invention is already known publically, or it is no longer 
“novel.”59  The § 102 subsections describe different types of prior art that can be 
used as evidence to establish that an invention is already public.60  If an invention 
qualifies as prior art, a patent on the subsequent invention is invalid.61 
Finally, § 10362 of the Patent Act is based on the concept of obviousness.63  This 
section provides that the invention must not have been obvious “to a person having 
ordinary skill in the art.”64  In determining obviousness, neither the motivation nor 
the purpose of the patentee is controlling.65  Rather, if the claim extends to what is 
obvious, it is invalid and un-patentable under § 103.66  A way to prove obviousness 
is to inquire whether, if at the time of invention, there was a known problem “for 
 
 53. See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 303 (1980).  
 54. Id. at 309.  
 55. See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 173, 185 (1980); Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 598 (1978); Gottschalk 
v. Benson, 409 U.S. 64, 67 (1972). 
 56. See Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3236 (2010).  
 57. See Ultramercial, LLC v. Hulu, LLC, 722 F.3d 1335, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (noting that defining 
“abstractness” has presented difficult problems, in the realm of § 101). 
 58. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2006).  
 59. Id. 
 60. Id.  This includes inventions that have already been described in existing patent applications and 
inventions that have been on sale for over a year prior to the filing of the patent application. Id.   
 61. Id.  
 62. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2006).   
 63. Id. at (a). “A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically disclosed or described 
as set forth in section 102, if the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art 
are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a 
person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains. Patentability shall not be negatived 
by the manner in which the invention was made.”  
 64. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406 (2007) (noting that § 103 of the Patent Act forbids 
issuance of a patent when “the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art 
are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a 
person having ordinary skill in the art”).  
 65. Id. at 397.  
 66. Id. at 407.  
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which there was an obvious solution encompassed by the patent’s claims.”67  In such 
a situation, patenting is inappropriate due to the element of obviousness. 
C) Supreme Court Precedent States That § 101 Is a Prerequisite That Must Be 
 Addressed Before §§ 102 and 103 Can Be Analyzed In Patent Infringement Cases 
In construing the Patent Act, the Supreme Court has decided many cases which 
have stated, both explicitly and implicitly, that the subject matter eligibility 
requirements contained in § 101 must be addressed before a court can analyze the 
other sections of the Patent Act.68  For the past 35 years, the Supreme Court has 
consistently affirmed and reaffirmed the importance of addressing § 101 at the 
onset of a patent invalidity challenge, before any consideration of §§ 102 and 103 
should take place.69  Though courts have held that § 101 must come first, its 
ambiguity and lack of concreteness has made other sections of the Patent Act, such 
as §§ 102 and 103, more appealing to judges in patent litigation.70 
In 1978, the Court decided Parker v. Flook, its first major opinion that 
introduced the idea that § 101 must be addressed before any other section of the 
Patent Act, in patent invalidity challenges.71  In Flook, a patent application would 
have hypothetically met the §§ 102 and 103 requirements of novelty and non-
obviousness.72  However, the Supreme Court rejected the application and did not 
analyze the §§ 102 and 103 requirements because the patent application did not 
meet the requirements of § 101—specifically, because the claimed process, 
considered as a whole, contained no patentable invention.73  The Court prominently 
emphasized that “the obligation to determine [whether an invention] falls within 
the ambit of section 101 ‘must precede the determination of whether that 
[invention] is, in fact, new or obvious.’”74  This language in Flook marshaled in the 
 
 67. Id. at 419–20.  
 68. See e.g., Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010); Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981); Parker v. 
Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978); State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 
1998) abrogated by In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 69. Flook, 437 U.S. at 584.  Decided in 1978, Flook was the first case to address the importance of 
addressing § 101 prior to any other statutory provision in the patent act.  Id. 
 70. See Peter S. Menell, Forty Years of Wondering in the Wilderness and No Closer to the Promised Land: 
Bilski’s Superficial Textualism and the Missed Opportunity to Return Patent Law to its Technology Mooring, 63 
STAN. L. REV. 1289, 1289 (2011) (noting the “lack of a forthright, principled framework for delineating the 
boundaries of patentable subject matter”). 
 71. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978).  Two years earlier in Dann v. Johnston, the Supreme Court held 
that the patents-in-suit were unpatentable as obvious, under § 103.  425 U.S. 219, 220 (1976).  However, the 
Court did not explicitly state that § 101 must come first.  Id.  
 72. Flook, 437 U.S. at 600.  
 73. Id. at 595 n. 18. (noting that “a claim for an improved method of calculation, even when tied to a 
specific end use, is unpatentable subject matter under § 101”).   
 74. Id. at 593. 
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beginning of judicial interpretation of the Patent Act requiring § 101 interpretation 
as a preliminary test. 
Two years after Flook, the Supreme Court elaborated on the wide scope of § 101 
and discussed the importance of its consideration.75  In Diamond v. Chakrabarty, the 
Supreme Court inquired into Congress’s intent and noted that, in drafting § 101, 
Congress intended for it to include “anything under the sun that is made by man.”76  
The Supreme Court accordingly adopted the idea of broad patentability.77  Then, in 
1981, the Supreme Court reaffirmed Flook in its decision in Diamond v. Diehr, 
where it expressly stated that the question of whether a particular invention meets 
the §§ 102 or 103 requirements does not affect the determination of whether it 
meets § 101’s subject matter eligibility requirement.78  In noting that a § 101 analysis 
is “wholly apart” from a § 102 or § 103 analysis, the Supreme Court provided 
important precedent that it and the Federal Circuit would use for the next three 
decades.79 
The Court’s view on the vital role that § 101 plays and its interpretation that § 
101 must always be analyzed first in patent cases was reaffirmed in 2010.80  In Bilski 
v. Kappos, the Court called the § 101 subject matter eligibility inquiry a “threshold 
test,” and specified that a claimed invention must not only satisfy § 101, but must 
also satisfy the conditions and requirements of §§ 102, 103, and 112 in order to 
receive the protection of the Patent Act.81  The importance of Bilski and whether it 
provided significant contributions to patent law have been debated by legal 
scholars.  Some scholars argue that Bilski was the most important Supreme Court 
decision that contributes to § 101 jurisprudence and that it had “the makings of a 
landmark decision.”82  However, other scholars disagree that Bilski was a major 
piece of § 101 jurisprudence, noting that Bilski did not provide any insight into 
what § 101 requires, and it specifically left out a test for assessing whether 
 
 75. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980).  
 76. Id. at 309; see also Ricardo Bonilla, A Patented Lie: Analyzing the Worthiness of Business Method Patents 
After Bilski v. Kappos, 43 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1285, 1298 (2011).  
 77. See Gerard N. Magliocca, Patenting the Curve Ball: Business Methods and Industry Norms, 2009 B.Y.U. 
L. REV. 875, 880 (2009) (noting that the legislative history of the Patent Act is often quoted by proponents of 
broad patentability).   
 78. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 176 (1981) (indicating that “[t]he questions of whether a particular 
invention meets the ‘novelty’ requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 102 or the ‘nonobviousness’ requirements of § 103 do 
not affect the determination of whether the invention falls into a category of subject matter that is eligible for 
patent protection under § 101”). 
 79. Id. at 190 (“[T]he question therefore of whether a particular invention is novel is ‘wholly apart’ from 
whether the invention falls into a category of statutory subject matter”). 
 80. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010). 
 81. Id. at 3225.  
 82. See Ebby Abraham, Bilski v. Kappos: Sideline Analysis from the First Inning of Play, 26 BERKELEY TECH. 
L.J. 15, 15 (2011). 
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something is an abstract idea.83  Though Bilski did not provide courts with precise 
guidance on how to conduct a § 101 analysis, it certainly reaffirmed the Supreme 
Court’s position that § 101 is a “threshold test,” necessary in the beginning of a 
patent analysis.84  Although several Supreme Court cases analyzing § 101 have been 
decided since Bilski, none of these cases have directly conflicted with Bilski’s express 
indication that § 101 must be addressed first.  Therefore, prior to 2012, Bilski 
remained unchallenged precedent.85 
D) Federal Circuit Precedent Has Followed the Supreme Court in Holding That § 101 
 is a Prerequisite That Must Be Addressed First In Patent Infringement Cases 
Similar to the Supreme Court, the Federal Circuit and its predecessors have held 
that the § 101 inquiry must come before an invention is screened through the §§ 
102 or 103 requirements.  Several decades of opinions, including some prior to the 
creation of the Federal Circuit, have noted the importance of addressing the § 101 
subject matter eligibility requirements before proceeding to the other sections of the 
Patent Act. 
In 1979, the United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals provided 
insight regarding how inventions “on the difficult path to patentability” must be 
analyzed.86  Using the analogy of opening doors, the court stated that the first door 
that must be opened by an inventor on the path to patentability is § 101.87  Only if 
the invention falls into any of the named categories described in § 101,88 the court 
noted, may it pass through the second door of § 102, which has a “novelty and loss 
of right to patent” sign on it.”89  Ten years later, the Federal Circuit revisited Bergy’s 
“first door” concept in St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., where it 
noted that the “first door which must be opened on the difficult path to 
patentability is § 101.”90  The St. Bank & Trust Co. court also stated that any 
invention which passes the § 101 subject matter eligibility requirements may be 
patented, provided that it meets the other patentability requirements found in §§ 
 
 83. See Jad Mills, Patentable Subject Matter in Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010), 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 377, 390 (2011).  
 84. See Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3225.  
 85. See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc. 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1304 (2012)  
(declining to substitute §§ 102, 103, and 112 inquiries for the better established inquiry under § 101).   
 86. See In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 960 (C.C.P.A. 1979) vacated in part, Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 444 U.S. 
1028 (1980).  
 87. Id.  The court stated that simply having an invention will not automatically open this first door.  Id.  
 88. Id.  The court noted that § 112 must be analyzed in providing a definition in the patent claims for an 
invention.  Id.  
 89. Id.  Notably, the language in the opinion did not mention § 103.  Id.  
 90. See State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1372 n. 2 (Fed. Cir. 1998) 
(quoting Bergy, 596 F.2d 952 at 960), abrogated by In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008).  
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102, 103, and 112.91  Again, this decision shows a preference by the courts to require 
§ 101 analysis before anything else. 
The Federal Circuit was quiet on the issue of § 101 as a preliminary question 
until it decided Comiskey, over a decade later in 2009.92  In In re Comiskey, the 
Federal Circuit stated that whether an invention meets the § 101 subject matter 
eligibility requirements is an “antecedent question” that must be addressed before 
the § 103 issue of non-obviousness can be addressed.93  Until that time, this was the 
Federal Circuit’s most explicit articulation that § 101 must be analyzed first.  
Comiskey spurred a rejuvenation of § 101 litigation in the Federal Circuit where, 
over the next three years, the “antecedent question” concept from Comiskey was 
revisited and affirmed by several decisions. 
One such affirmation occurred in Research Corp. Technologies, Inc. v. Microsoft 
Corp., where the Federal Circuit affirmed the Bilski standard that the § 101 inquiry 
is a “threshold test.”94  In discussing the Patent Act, the court referred to § 101 as a 
“coarse eligibility filter.”95  The following year, in Ultramercial, LLC v. Hulu, LLC, 
the court reaffirmed the “coarse eligibility filter” concept and also clarified the 
scope of § 101 by indicating that it should not be used to invalidate patents “[based 
on] concerns about vagueness, indefinite disclosure, [and] lack of enablement.”96  
Rather, the court indicated that other patent requirements should be used to weed 
out undeserving inventions, after they have passed the coarse eligibility filter.97 
In 2012, the Federal Circuit decided Dealertrach, Inc. v. Huber98—the most recent 
relevant decision before MySpace.  In Dealertrack, the court followed precedent and 
granted summary judgment because the patents-in-suit were ineligible subject 
 
 91. See Id. at 1372 (noting that “[t]he plain and unambiguous meaning of § 101 is that any invention 
falling within one of the four stated categories of statutory subject matter may be patented, provided it meets 
the other requirements for patentability set forth in Title 35, i.e., those found in §§ 102, 103, and 112”). 
 92. In re Comiskey, 554 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 93. Comiskey, 554 F.3d at 975.  The court rejected the applicant’s argument that his application was 
“patentable under § 101, and that the subject matter of his application did not fall within an exception to 
patentability, such as an abstract idea, natural phenomena, or law of nature.”  Id. at 972-73.  
 94. Research Corp. Technologies, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 627 F.3d 859, 868 (Fed. Cir. 2010).  
 95. Id. at 869.  It also bears noting that the court affirmed the importance of §§ 102 and 103 by stating that 
§ 101 eligibility should not become a substitute for the other requirements of the Patent Act.  Id. at 868 (noting 
that the Supreme Court has advised that §101 eligibility should not become a substitute for a patentability 
analysis related to prior art, adequate disclosure, or the other conditions and requirements of Title 35); see also 
Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC, 659 F.3d 1057, 1066 (Fed. Cir. 2011), cert. denied, No. 11-1078, 
2013 WL 141405 (U.S. Jan. 14, 2013) (emphasizing the differences between the threshold inquiry of patent-
eligibility, and the substantive conditions of patentability”).   
 96. See Ultramercial, LLC v. Hulu, LLC, 722 F.3d 1335, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2013).  The court also explained 
that although expansive, the § 101 requirements are not substitutes for the substantive patentability 
requirements set out in §§ 102, 103, and 112.  Id. at 1341. 
 97. Id. at 1354. 
 98. 674 F.3d 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
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matter under the preliminary § 101 inquiry.99  Although the court did not create 
new § 101 precedent, this case is the most recent example of the Federal Circuit 
following its earlier precedent—that a patent whose validity is challenged must first 
be evaluated under § 101 before a §§ 102 or 103 analysis may be undertaken under 
the Patent Act.  Notably, the dissent in Dealertrack argued that courts should 
exercise their judicial authority by insisting that litigants initially address patent 
invalidity issues through §§ 102, 103, and 112, instead of “foray[ing] into the 
jurisprudential morass of § 101 unless absolutely necessary.”100  The dissenting 
opinion explained that it would have reversed the decision and remanded for a 
determination of validity under § 103 of the Patent Act.101 
III. THE COURT’S REASONING 
In MySpace, Inc. v. GraphOn Corp., the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit affirmed an order granting summary judgment of patent invalidity 
by the United States District Court for the Northern District of California.102  
Writing for the court, Judge Plager affirmed the grant of summary judgment of 
invalidity of the patents-in-suit, noting that the district court correctly decided the 
case under §§ 102 and 103 of the Patent Act, as opposed to under § 101 as urged by 
the dissent.103  The court then held that “database” included both hierarchal and 
relational systems and the grant of summary judgment for MySpace was proper.104 
The court first discussed the importance of correctly defining “database.”105  To 
do so, the court analyzed the ordinary and customary meaning of the claim 
language in the written description of the invention found in the patent.106  
Specifically, the court explained that an analysis of the language in the “Summary of 
the Invention,”107 “Background of the invention,”108 and “Detailed Description of 
 
 99. Id. at 1334-35.  Once the court found the patents-in-suit ineligible under § 101, it did not conduct a §§ 
102 or 103 analysis.  Id. at 1335.  
 100. Id. at 1335 (Plager, J., dissenting).  This was the same approach used by the court in MySpace. 
MySpace, Inc. v. GraphOn Corp., 672 F.3d 1250 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
 101. Dealertrack, 674 F.3d at 1335.  
 102. 672 F.3d at 1250. 
 103. Id. at 1262.  
 104. Id. at 1257.  
 105. Id. at 1255.  The Court noted that if “database” was defined to cover both hierarchical and relational 
systems, then the MBB would invalidate all the patents-in-suit as either anticipated under § 102 or obvious 
under § 103.  Id.  However, if “database” was defined to cover only relational systems, summary judgment 
would be inappropriate because there would be a genuine issue of disputed fact regarding the question of 
invalidity.  Id.  
 106. Id.  
 107. Id. at 1256.  
 108. Id.  
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the Preferred Embodiments”109 sections, indicated that “database” should not be 
limited to just relational systems, but should be broadly defined to also encompass 
other types of databases.110  The court thus agreed that the district court’s claim 
construction of “database” was correct, as it was both reasonable and supported by 
context.111 
Next, the court rejected GraphOn’s argument that the district court erred in its 
conclusion that all the claims were either invalid as anticipated under § 102 or 
obvious under § 103.112  The court pointed out that a complete analysis of the claim 
language should generally be undertaken.113  However, the court explained that in 
this case, the analysis was not a prerequisite of granting summary judgment because 
all the claims share a common term that lies at the heart of the invention—the term 
“database.”114  Therefore, the district court’s construction of “database” sufficiently 
supported its conclusion that there was no triable issue of fact regarding whether 
the MBB was a database as used in the patents-in-suit, despite not having engaged 
in a § 101 analysis.115  Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court’s conclusion 
that the patents-in-suit were inappropriate as they were anticipated or obvious.116 
The majority of the court strongly disagreed with the dissent’s reasoning that § 
101 should have been addressed before §§ 102 and 103.117  Although the court 
acknowledged that some judicial dicta supported the dissent’s position,118 it 
highlighted the ambiguity of §101119 as it argued for judicial restraint as a means of 
avoiding “the murky morass that is § 101 jurisprudence.”120  The court noted that 
the problem with addressing § 101 initially in patent cases is that precedent is 
extremely unclear as to what is or is not patentable subject matter, particularly in 
regards to abstractness.121  This lack of standards, the court explained, has led to a 
lot of uncertainty regarding what is or is not patentable subject matter.122 
 
 109. Id. at 1256–57. 
 110. Id.  
 111. Id. at 1257.  
 112. Id.  
 113. Id.  
 114. Id. at 1257–58.  
 115. See id.  
 116. Id. at 1258.  
 117. Id. at 1258–62.  
 118. Id. at 1258.  
 119. Id. at 1259.  The Court noted that judges continue to vigorously disagree over what is or what is not 
patentable subject matter under § 101.  Id.  
 120. Id. at 1260. 
 121. Id. at 1259.  The Court has established that laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas are 
not patentable subject matter.  Id. at 1258.  Over the years, some standards that provide workable guidelines 
have emerged for laws of nature and physical phenomena.  Id. at 1259. However, courts have had trouble 
interpreting what abstract ideas encompasses.  Id.  Part of the reason for this confusion is that “abstract ideas” 
lacks a concrete definition because courts have declined to define “abstract” beyond the recognition that this is a 
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Rather than taking this messy path to the same result, as urged by the dissent, the 
court argued that § 101 can be avoided by litigants addressing patent invalidity 
issues through §§ 102, 103, and 112.123  The court noted that this is more practical 
because, unlike § 101 jurisprudence, these criteria are “well developed and generally 
well understood,”124 and it is a waste of time to “[reach] for interpretations of broad 
provisions, such as § 101, when more specific statutes, such as §§ 102, 103, and 112, 
can decide the case.”125  Lastly, the court noted that this approach would preclude § 
101 from becoming a toss-in for every patent infringement suit.126  Therefore, the 
court defended its avoidance of § 101 in favor of §§ 102 and 103, and “decline[d] 
the dissent’s invitation to put the parties . . . in the swamp that is § 101 
jurisprudence.”127 
In dissent, Judge Mayer fervently argued that the court mistakenly failed to 
address the subject matter eligibility requirements contained in § 101 before 
addressing the §§ 102 and 103 issues of anticipation and obviousness.128  The dissent 
pointed to both Federal Circuit and Supreme Court precedent establishing the 
proposition that the § 101 subject matter eligibility requirement is an “antecedent 
question” that must be addressed first.129  The dissent explained that the court 
should have used a “robust application of section 101”130 to conclude that the 
patents-in-suit did not meet § 101’s subject matter eligibility requirements as 
required by precedent.  While the dissent agreed that the patents-in-suit were 
invalid, it arrived at this conclusion through a different jurisprudential path.131 
Although Judge Mayer argued that § 101 should have been addressed first, he 
rejected the contention that § 101 should function as a “coarse eligibility filter” 
while other patent validity requirements such as §§ 102, 103, or 112 should be used 
to weed out patents of dubious quality.132  In calling that approach a “misplaced 
reliance on sections 102, 103, or 112,” the dissent affirmed § 101’s importance by 
 
disqualifying characteristic. As the internet and computer culture has grown, the confusion as to what is an 
“abstract idea” has exponentially increased.  Id.  
 122. Id. at 1259. The Court compares judges interpreting § 101 with an oenologist trying to describe a new 
wine, where picking adjectives to describe the wine depends less “on the assumed content of the words than on 
the taste of the tongue pronouncing them.”  Id. 
 123. Id. at 1260.  
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. at 1261.  The court noted that if this were done in every patent case, it would be unnecessary to 
address § 101 because the validity of patents could simply be concluded under §§ 102, 103, and 112.  Id. at 1260.  
 126. Id. at 1261.  
 127. Id. at 1262.  
 128. Id. at 1264 (Mayer, J., dissenting).  Specifically, the issue of whether GraphOn’s patents were an 
unpatentable “abstract idea.”  Id. 
 129. Id.  
 130. Id. at 1269.  
 131. Id. at 1265.  
 132. Id. at 1268.  
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emphasizing that all claims must meet those requirements in order to address 
“[c]oncerns about attempts to call any form of human activity a ‘process.’”133  
Lastly, the dissent explained that § 101 was designed to strike a balance between 
“protecting inventors and not granting monopolies over procedures that others 
would discover by independent, creative application of general principles.”134  
Therefore, the dissent reasoned that addressing § 101 at the onset is required to 
ensure that the patent laws perform their designed function.135 
IV. ANALYSIS 
In MySpace, Inc. v. GraphOn Corp., the United States Federal Circuit affirmed an 
order granting summary judgment of patent invalidity of four patents-in-suit.136  
The MySpace court incorrectly ignored decades of contrary precedent from the 
Supreme Court and Federal Circuit137 when it consciously decided to forego the § 
101 subject matter eligibility analysis before addressing §§ 102, 103, and 112.138  
Conversely, the dissent correctly argued that the court should have addressed the § 
101 issue at the beginning of the invalidity analysis.139  Because Federal Circuit 
decisions are binding,140 the MySpace decision is going to further complicate the 
already immensely unclear and “murky morass” that is § 101 jurisprudence.141  As a 
result of contradicting precedent and a lack of clear standards, judges faced with the 
confusing task of determining patent validity will likely use their own discretion, 
which may result in many conflicting opinions.  Therefore, the surprisingly 
unresolved issue of whether § 101 is an “antecedent question” may not have a 
definitive answer until the Supreme Court once again explicitly says so. 
 
A) The Dissent Correctly Argued that the Court Mistakenly Ignored Precedent when it 
Intentionally Bypassed the Preliminary § 101 Analysis and Went Straight to §§ 102 
 and 103 
The MySpace dissent correctly argued that the court ignored precedent when it 
purposefully side-stepped the § 101 subject matter eligibility issue and went straight 
 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. at 1269 (citing Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3228).  
 135. Id. at 1269–70 (citing Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 192 (1981)).   
 136. Id. at 1264 (majority opinion).  
 137. See e.g., Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010); Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981); Parker v. 
Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978); State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 
1998) abrogated by In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 138. Id. at 1260.  
 139. MySpace, 672 F.3d at 1264 (Mayer, J., dissenting).  
 140. See discussion supra Part II.A.  
 141. MySpace, 672 F.3d at 1260 (majority opinion).  
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to a §§ 102 and 103 analysis.142  Although the court avoided § 101 because of its lack 
of clarity, this decision undermines over three decades of binding precedent and 
does not bring any clarity to the issue of patent validity.143  The Supreme Court144 
and Federal Circuit145 have repeatedly affirmed and reaffirmed the notion that an 
invention cannot be patented if it does not initially meet the § 101 requirements in 
addition to the other Patent Act requirements; therefore, the MySpace court’s 
exercise of “judicial restraint” 146  was misplaced. 
Although there is no shortage of opinions stating that § 101 must be analyzed 
before §§ 102 and 103, the language in Bilski and Comiskey provides necessary 
clarity to the issue.147  In calling the § 101 subject matter eligibility inquiry a 
“threshold test,” Bilski very explicitly stated that § 101 should be addressed at the 
onset of litigation regarding patent invalidity.148  Similarly, Comiskey clearly 
indicated that whether an invention meets the § 101 subject eligibility requirements 
is an “antecedent question” that must always be addressed before any other section 
of the Patent Act can be analyzed.149  In acknowledging, yet ignoring the precedent 
set in Bilski and Comiskey, as well as many other preceding cases, the MySpace court 
incorrectly exercised judicial restraint to bypass the § 101 analysis.  As much of a 
“murky morass” as § 101 jurisprudence is,150 the MySpace court’s recommendation 
to ignore the § 101 analysis disregarded precedent. 
In ignoring the preliminary § 101 analysis, the MySpace court adopted the 
approach set forth in the Dealertrack dissent earlier in 2012,151 where the dissent 
argued that courts should exercise their judicial authority by avoiding § 101 unless 
absolutely necessary.152  Interestingly, the author of the dissent in Dealertrack was 
the same author of the MySpace opinion—Judge Plager.153  Judge Plager’s position is 
more apparent in MySpace as he was the author of the majority opinion, as opposed 
 
 142. MySpace, 672 F.3d at 1264, 1268 (Mayer, J., dissenting).  
 143. See discussion supra Part II.C–D.  
 144. See discussion supra Part II.C. 
 145. See discussion supra Part II.D.  
 146. MySpace, 672 F.3d at 1258 (majority opinion) (urging “judicial restraint in the face of what has become 
a plethora of opinions adding to [ ] § 101 jurisprudence”).  
 147. See Bilski, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3225 (2010) (holding that the § 101 issue is a threshold inquiry); In re 
Comiskey, 554 F.3d 967, 975 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (holding that whether an invention meets the § 101 requirements 
is an “antecedent question”).  
 148. Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3225. 
 149. Comiskey, 554 F.3d at 975.  
 150. MySpace, 672 F.3d at 1260.  
 151. Dealertrack, Inc. v. Huber, 674 F.3d 1315, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (Plager, J., dissenting). 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id; see also MySpace, 672 F.3d at 1253 (exhibiting Judge Plager’s ideological switch from the dissent in 
Dealertrack to the majority in MySpace).  
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to the dissent in Dealertrack.154  Procedurally, the MySpace court was able to avoid 
analyzing § 101 because it was not the issue being appealed.155  However, under the 
precedent set by the Dealertrack court, it seems necessary for the court to consider § 
101 first.156 
B) The Contrary Precedent Set By MySpace Further Complicates An Already Unclear 
 and Convoluted Area of Law 
In determining that §§ 102 and 103 should be analyzed before § 101 as a means 
of better facilitating patent invalidity analyses,157 the MySpace court further 
complicated an already messy area of the law.158  As discussed above, although most 
inventions would normally fall under § 101’s purview, the judicial exceptions of 
laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas restrict the reach of § 101.  
Although there is case law clarifying and providing guidelines for analyzing laws of 
nature and physical phenomena, the meaning of abstract ideas and what it may 
encompass remains ambiguous.  Indeed, abstractness presents a different set of 
interpretive problems than laws or nature and physical phenomena, as almost 
anything can be construed to be an abstract idea.159 
In response, courts have cautioned that while the core of a claim can often be 
characterized as an abstract idea, courts should not “go hunting for abstractions by 
ignoring the concrete, palpable, tangible, and otherwise not abstract invention the 
 
 154. Dealertrack, 674 F.3d at 1335 (Plager, J., dissenting).  In the Dealertrack dissent, Judge Plager argued 
that §101 should have been bypassed in favor of §§ 102 and 103.  Id.  In his majority opinion in MySpace, he 
affirmed this idea by emphasizing the importance of avoiding § 101 in favor of other sections of the Patent Act.  
MySpace, 672 F.3d at 1253.  
 155. MySpace, 672 F.3d at 1250; see also See Brian Wallenfelt, Avoiding the “Judicial Morass” of Section 101 in 
MySpace, Inc. v. GraphOn Corp., PATENTS4SOFTWARE, http://www.patents4software.com/2012/03/avoiding-
the-”judicial-morass”-of-section-101-in-myspace-inc-v-graphon-corp/ (last visited Nov. 11, 2013). 
 156. But see CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. 685 F.3d 1341, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2012).  Decided after 
MySpace, the court in CLS Bank emphasized the different function of § 101 from the other sections of the 
Patent Act, notably §§§ 102, 103, and 112. The Federal Circuit ultimately held that § 101 issues do not always 
need to be addressed first, particularly when other sections could resolve a dispute more expeditiously or with 
more clarity and predictability.  Id.  The court also noted that §§ 101, 102, 103, and 112 all serve a different 
purpose and play distinctly different roles.  Id.  The Federal Circuit’s holding in CLS Bank is problematic as it 
affirms the MySpace court’s conscious decision to bypass the § 101 analysis.  As discussed below, this new 
conflicting precedent will result in even more future conflicting precedent, as judges will have the option of 
supporting a decision to use § 101 or a decision to bypass it with precedent.  
 157. MySpace, 672 F.3d at 1260. 
 158. See Matthew DeIulio, Courts Left with Little Guidance Following the Supreme Court’s Decision in Bilski v. 
Kappos, 13 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 285, 292-93 (2010) (discussing the uncertainty faced by courts 
regarding the proper test to apply in determining the patentability of various subject matters).  
 159. See supra note 57.  
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patentee actually claims.”160  Additionally, the Federal Circuit has struggled in 
attempting to develop a rigid standard for what is an unpatentable abstract idea 
under § 101.  Despite the difficulties of conducting a § 101 analysis, such an analysis 
must take place, as § 101’s inclusion in the Patent Act161 indicates that Congress 
intended for its inclusion in any subsequent analysis of patent invalidity.  Had 
Congress intended otherwise, it seems logical to assume that they would not have 
included § 101 in the Patent Act. 
Prior to MySpace, case law did not offer any apparent standards or guidelines 
regarding what “abstract ideas” were or how to screen them.162  Despite this, courts 
generally seemed to understand that precedent required the messy § 101 analysis to 
always be addressed first.163  In light of MySpace, courts will now not only be unclear 
about how to conduct the § 101 analysis, but there will also be contradicting 
decisions regarding whether such an analysis is even necessary.  Lacking guidelines, 
judges will be afforded a plethora of discretion in determining whether or not to 
address § 101.  This discretion will result in a case-by-case analysis for patentable 
subject matter eligibility requirements, as an individual best judgment standard will 
be all judges have to rely on when issuing patents to prospective claimants.164 
Judges employing an individual best judgment standard are problematic, as it 
will result in a wide array of decisions and reasoning, which will in turn create 
administrative obstacles in the future because, quite simply, different judges have 
different tastes.165  This will have a drastic effect on the entire patent system, as 
different judges will employ different standards in determining whether patents are 
invalid—namely, many judges may decline to analyze § 101 even when a patent 
cannot be invalidated under §§ 102 or 103.  For example, where one judge may find 
a patent invalid after noting that it does not meet the requirements of § 101, 
another judge may skip the § 101 analysis and find that same patent valid.  This 
 
 160. The Federal Circuit addresses the abstract idea exception to 35 U.S.C. § 101, LEXOLOGY, 
http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=1f97db5c-906c-4cfb-9df4-875172f881c0 (Aug 27, 2012) (citing 
CLS Bank, 685 F.3d at 1351).  
 161. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). 
 162. See Menell, supra note 74, at 1313-14 (emphasizing the “lack of a forthright, principled framework for 
delineating the boundaries of patentable subject matter”); see also DeIulio, supra note 162, at 293 (noting that 
the Supreme Court has blurred section § 101’s application and scope as a result of refusing to establish any 
particular rules for patent eligibility).  
 163. See discussion supra Part II.C–D. 
 164. See Mills, supra note 88, at 391 (stressing that a “discretionary patentable subject matter standard 
implies that the analysis should be conducted on a “case-by-case basis” and thus leaves the determination 
“within the reviewing body’s sole discretion”); cf., J.H. Reichman, Legal Hybrids Between the Patent and 
Copyright Paradigms, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2432, 2519 (1994) (asserting that an empirically based approach is 
needed to stabilize our unstable intellectual property system).   
 165. MySpace, Inc. v. GraphOn Corp., 672 F.3d 1250, 1259 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (comparing judges applications 
of § 101 with oenologists trying to describe a new wine, where an adjective to describe the wine “depends less on 
the assumed content of the words than on the taste of the tongue pronouncing them”).  
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would strongly undermine the patent system as the composition of the judges 
analyzing the claim would play as significant a role as the claim’s merits in 
determining patent eligibility.  Therefore, the MySpace decision negatively 
contributes to the already unclear universe of § 101 jurisprudence.166 
C) The Supreme Court Will Eventually Need to Readdress the Issue of Whether § 101  is 
a Preliminary Question in Order to Clarify the Confusion 
In 2010, Bilski definitively established that the § 101 issue is a “threshold test” 
that must be addressed before §§ 102 and 103 issues.167  Although how to apply the 
§ 101 analysis is unclear, the necessity of analyzing § 101 first is clear.  However, just 
two years after Bilski’s guidance, the MySpace opinion contributed confusion to the 
unclear realm of § 101.168  In light of MySpace, courts faced with determining 
whether a patent is invalid will not only lack clear guidelines regarding how to 
conduct the § 101 inquiry,169 but will also be conflicted regarding whether the § 101 
subject matter eligibility requirements should be addressed at the onset of the 
analysis.  In MySpace, the court was able to easily avoid the question of whether to 
use § 101 at all in the case because it was not the issue under appeal.170  However, 
there will certainly be future cases where the § 101 issue cannot be avoided as 
easily.171  This will undeniably result in more mixed and conflicting opinions as the 
determination of whether a patent is invalid may very well fall on whether the 
sitting judge decides to employ the § 101 analysis first. 
To rectify the confusion created by MySpace, the Supreme Court will need to 
once again declare whether § 101 issues must be addressed before other sections of 
the Patent Act can be analyzed. If the Supreme Court understates MySpace and 
reaffirms decades of § 101 jurisprudence, § 101 will unquestioningly need to be 
addressed at the beginning of patent litigation.  Additionally, the Supreme Court 
should provide long-overdue guidance regarding the meaning of “abstract ideas,” 
what it encompasses, and how courts should conduct an abstract ideas § 101 
analysis.  This is important as it would bring much-needed clarity to this area of 
law.  However, if the Supreme Court agrees with MySpace and determines that 
 
 166. Id. at 1260.  
 167. See Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3225 (2010).  
 168. See DeIulio, supra note 162, at 292–93 (discussing the uncertainty faced by courts regarding the proper 
test to apply in determining the patentability of various subject matters). 
 169. See discussion supra Part IV.B.  
 170. See Brian Wallenfelt, Avoiding the “Judicial Morass” of Section 101 in MySpace, Inc. v. GraphOn Corp., 
PATENTS4SOFTWARE, http://www.patents4software.com/2012/03/avoiding-the-”judicial-morass”-of-section-
101-in-myspace-inc-v-graphon-corp/ (last visited Nov. 11, 2013).  
 171. Id. (noting that under Dealertrack, the court would consider the section 101 issue if a party is seeking 
summary judgment under section 101 to avoid the time and expense of trial, however, it is unclear if the 
MySpace decision will change this).   
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courts would be better off avoiding messy § 101 jurisprudence in favor of clearer 
sections of the Patent Act,172 then § 101’s importance and use will be greatly 
diminished.  Regardless of which approach the Supreme Court takes, the decision 
of the MySpace court illustrates the importance of an end-all-be-all Supreme Court 
decision regarding whether or not § 101 must be addressed at the beginning of a 
patent invalidity analysis.173 
V. CONCLUSION 
In MySpace v. GraphOn, the United States Federal Circuit held that judges could 
exercise their judicial authority to bypass the § 101 subject matter eligibility 
requirement issue in favor of other sections of the Patent Act, such as §§ 102 and 
103.174  The court incorrectly ignored a plethora of Supreme Court and Federal 
Circuit precedent which states that § 101 is a “threshold test” and an “antecedent 
question.”175  This seemingly contradictory precedent set by MySpace will further 
complicate the already “murky morass” that is § 101 jurisprudence.176  Accordingly, 
the Supreme Court will eventually need to, once again, rule on whether § 101 is a 
preliminary question or if judges can avoid the confusion associated with its 
application by ignoring § 101 altogether.177  In conclusion, it really is as simple as 
counting—101 comes before 102 and 103. 
 
 172. MySpace, 672 F.3d at 1260.  
 173. Leading Cases, 126 HARV. L. REV. 347, 357 (2012) (noting that, as a result of a lack of guidance for the 
Federal Circuit, the stage has been set for an appeal of another § 101 case).  
 174. MySpace, Inc. v. GraphOn Corp., 672 F.3d 1250, 1253 (Fed. Cir. 2012).  
 175. See discussion supra Part IV.A. 
 176. See discussion supra Part IV.B.  
 177. See discussion supra Part IV.C.  
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